Impact of Corporate Governance on the Performance of Selected Banks in Nigeria by Adeyinka, Adedeji Elijah & Benjamin, Ajulo Olajide
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)  




Impact of Corporate Governance on the Performance of Selected 
Banks in Nigeria 
 
Adedeji Elijah Adeyinka 
Federal University of Technology, Akure , Ondo State  
 
Ajulo Olajide Benjamin 
Ladoke Akintola University of Technology, Ogbomoso 
 
Abstract 
The impact of corporate governance on the performance of selected banks in Nigeria has become a wide-
reaching truism that the quality of corporate governance makes a significant difference to and has a chief effect 
on the performance of banks. Effective corporate governance requires a clear understanding of the respective 
role of the board and of senior management and their relationships with others in the corporate structure.This 
study aim to examine the relationship that exists between corporate governance and banks performance of 
selected commercial banks in Nigeria. Using regression analysis of 5 years ranging from 2014 – 2018. The stock 
performance being the response variable was captured by Market price per share (MPS) while the explanatory 
variables included Board Size (BS), Corporate Governance Disclosure Index (CGDI), Non-Executive Director 
(NED) and Number of Female Director (NUM) are the regressors used in achieving this objective. Descriptive 
analysis was used to ascertain the mean (1.64141; MPS, 2.658831; BS, 2.145323; NED, 1.127043; NUM 
0.933143; CGDI) median, Maximum, Minimum. Correlation was carried out and a positive and strong 
relationship were generated.Post estimation diagnostic test of Hausman test and redundant fixed effect test were 
adopted in selecting the most appropriate model to capture the impact of corporate governance characteristics on 
stock performance of banks. The test indicated that random effect is not an appropriate model and non-normality 
of the variables will not encourage the use of ordinary effect, therefore, in estimating the parsimonious model of 
the variable, fixed effect will be an appropriate assumption. 86.78% of the stock performance of banks was 
accounted for by the explanatory variables.The work suggests that efforts should be made to improve corporate 
governance focus on the stock performance of deposit money banks since the stock performance is a measure of 
the wealth of shareholders. Also, the Central bank of Nigeria and other relevant authorities should also try to 
ensure that steps are taken for mandatory and absolute compliance with the code of corporate governance. Also, 
an effective legal framework should be developed that specifies the rights and obligations of a bank, its directors, 
shareholders, specific disclosure requirements and provide for effective enforcement of the law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has become a wide-reaching truism that the quality of corporate governance makes a significant difference to 
and has a chief effect on the performance of banks. Corporate governance, in simple term, refers to the extent to 
which companies are run in a manner that is fair, open and acceptable. Thus, effective corporate governance 
practice combines transparency, openness, accurate reporting and compliance with statutory regulations among 
others. Antecedents and experiences indicate there is a noteworthy relationship between good corporate 
governance in banks and their financial performance; invariably one of the sources of instability and 
unpredictability in the banking sector is lack or inadequate practice of corporate governance. Wherever a power 
is achieved, either directly or through delegation, to direct, control and regulate activities that affect people, there 
is need for good, noble and worthy exercise of such power. For corporate entities, particularly public liability 
companies, the exercise of power over the enterprise’s direction, the supervision and control of executive 
actions, concern for the effects of the enterprise’s operations on other parties and especially the environment, the 
acceptance of a fiduciary duty to be accountable for such, constitute the ideal corporate governance practice. 
The Consolidation of the Nigeria Banking Industry makes the institution of corporate governance a 
prerequisite in the industry. Presently, twenty-two publicly quoted commercial banks exists, hence, the need for 
corporate governance to take the centre stage in the control and supervision of these banks. Hence, effective 
corporate governance requires a clear understanding of the respective role of the board and of senior 
management and their relationships with others in the corporate structure. The relationships of the board of 
directors with shareholders should be characterized by openness; their relationships with employees should be 
characterized by fairness; their relationships with the communities in which they operate should be characterized 
by good and responsible citizenship, and their relationships with government should be characterized by 
commitment to compliance and good corporate citizenship (Anya, 2003). 
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Banks, like many other commercial establishments are expected to generate profit through effective and 
efficient utilization of resources (inputs) to create sound asset portfolio (output) and ensure the maximisation of 
shareholders’ wealth. Banks make profit from the spread between interest charged on deposit and loan interest 
rate. These differentials ought to compensate adequately for the investors contribution and the service provider 
as well, if corporate governance has to be used as a yard stick in determining financial performance. Banks 
financial performance therefore, could be seen in terms of the absolute profits, rate of return, earnings per share, 
market price per share, the quality of asset portfolio, and the level of liquidity. Banks’ financial performance 
however is not determined by inputs of managers alone but is also dependent on the environment within which 
the bank operates. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Nigerian Banks are faced with myriad of problems despite the mandatory action of banks consolidation 
pronounced by Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in 2005 so as to make banks more effective and strengthen their 
performance. However, several banks collapsing as a result of weak systems of corporate governance and 
internal control system have highlighted the need to improve and reform corporate governance at an international 
level. (Onakoya,Ofoegbu and Fasanya 2011). The multifaceted corporate governance problems in the Nigerian 
banking sector include: weak internal control system, non-compliance with laid down internal control and 
operational procedure, ignorance of and non-compliance with rules, laws and regulations guiding banking 
business; passive shareholders, disagreement between board and management giving rise to board squabbles, 
ineffective board oversight function, fraudulent and self-serving practices among members of the board, 
management and staff, over bearing influence of chairman or Chief Executive Officer (CEO), non-challant 
attitude of owners, poor risk management practices, resulting in large quantity of non-performing loans including 
insider-related credit; sit tight directors-even where such directors fail to make meaningful contribution to the 
growth and development of the banks; succumbing to pressure from other stakeholders like shareholders appetite 
for high dividend and returns and depositors quest for high interest on deposits, technical incompetence, poor 
leadership and administrative inability, inability to plan and respond to changing business circumstance as at 
when due and ineffective management information system (Yauri, Muhammed and Kaoje, 2012). 
The experiences of advanced countries have demonstrated a positive marriage of convenience between 
well-coordinated wealth management and economic development. Lack of framework to manage wealth 
continues to plague and plunge less developed counties, like Nigeria into the vicious circle of poverty. Nigeria 
has a lot of resources being the seventh largest oil producer in the world but lack the ability to manage wealth by 
effectively developing and encouraging indigenous and foreign investment. This inability has a direct 
relationship with the need for efficient corporate governance in Nigeria for sustainable development. The lack of 
effective corporate governance in Nigeria has worked to the disadvantage of shareholders and created a class of 
stakeholder who has lost interest in the system. The corporate governance culture in Nigeria have persistently 
failed to be responsible to the stakeholders and has no deep rooted mechanisms to a balance among the major 
players (board of directors, shareholders and management) in the system or economy. However, corporate 
governance improves management oversight and increases disclosure and quality of reported financial 
information (Hermalin, 2005) and reduces the information asymmetry between managers and capital providers 
(Dogan & Smyth, 2002). 
Several researches have been undertaken in this area and each researcher gave a different view and results.  
Emeka and Alem (2016) studied the effects of corporate governance on bank’s financial performance in Nigeria 
for period of 2004-2013. Other research works focused on the corporate governance and bank’s financial 
performance in Nigeria and /or in other countries include, Dzingai and Fakoya (2017), Nguyen and Tran (2017), 
Muhammed (2013), Yauri, Muhammed and Kaoje (2012), Onakoya, Ofoegbu and Fasanya (2011), Uwuigbe 
(2011). However, the review of previous empirical literature revealed a lack of established significant influence 
of corporate governance on return on assets over the period of 2013- 2017 that is, five years’ financial summary 
in the research findings of past researchers which indicates the existence of a research gap. Therefore, this 
research study seeks to close this gap by providing a detailed analysis of the relationship that exists between 
corporate governance and banks performance of selected commercial banks in Nigeria. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
(i) What is the level of corporate governance on performance of selected commercial banks in Nigeria? 
(ii) What is the relationship between the level of corporate governance disclosure and the performance of 
selected commercial banks in Nigeria? 
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OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The general objective of this study is to analyse the impact of corporate governance on banks performance in 
Nigeria while the specific objectives of this study are to: 
(i)  determine the level of corporate governance on selected commercial banks in Nigeria over the period of 
study. 
(ii)  ascertain the relationship between the level of corporate governance disclosure and the performance of 
selected commercial banks in Nigeria. 
(iii)  analyse the effect of corporate governance characteristics on performance of selected commercial banks 
in Nigeria. 
 
HYPOTHESES OF THE STUDY 
H0: Corporate governance has no impact on banks performance in Nigeria 
H1: Corporate governance has an impact on banks performance in Nigeria. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are many ways of defining corporate governance, ranging from narrow definitions that focus on 
companies and their shareholders, to broader definitions that incorporate the accountability of companies to 
many other groups of people, or stakeholders’. Some of these include: 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1999 defined corporate 
governance as the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The corporate governance 
structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, 
such as, the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for 
making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company 
objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance.” Oman (2001) 
defined corporate governance refers to the private and public institutions that include laws, regulations and the 
business practices which govern the relationship between the corporate managers and the stakeholders. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development provides another perspective by stating that 
“corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The corporate 
governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the 
corporation, such as the Board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and 
procedure for making decisions on corporate affairs. 
 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The premise of the argument of corporate governance, as seen by both academics as well as other independent 
researchers, can be traced back to the pioneering work of Berle and Means (1932). They observed that the 
modern corporations having acquired a very large size could create the possibility of separation of control over a 
firm from its direct ownership. Berle and Means‟ observation of the departure of the owners from the actual 
control of the corporations led to a renewed emphasis on the behavioural dimension of the theory of the firm. 
Governance is a word with a pedigree that dates back to Chaucer. In his days, it carries with it the 
connotation “wise and responsible”, which is appropriate. It means either the action or the method of governing 
and it is in the latter sense that it is used with reference to companies. Its Latin root, “gubernare‟ means to steer 
and a quotation which is worth keeping in mind in this context is: “He that governs sit s quietly at the stern and 
scarce is seen to stir” (Cadbury, 1992). 
  
PRINCIPLES OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Pandey (2005) opines that good corporate governance requires companies to adopt practices and policies which 
compromise performance, accountability, effective management control by the board of directors, constitution of 
board committee as part of professionally qualified, non-executive and independent directors on the board, the 
adequate timely disclosure of information and the prompt discharge of statutory duties. Chris (2006) sees key 
elements of good corporate governance principles as also include honesty, trust and integrity, openness, 
performance orientation, responsibility and accountability, mutual respect and commitment to the organisation. 
Directors and management develop a model of governance that aligns the values of the corporate participants 
and then evaluate this model periodically for its effectiveness. In particular, senior executives should conduct 
themselves honestly and ethically especially concerning actual or apparent conflict of interest and disclosure in 
financial report. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) put forward a set of international 
principles of corporate governance. These principles were developed both in response to growing recognition of 
the importance of governance to enterprise performance. The OECD principles are organised under five 
headings, namely: the right of shareholders, the equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholders, 
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disclosure & transparency, and the responsibility of the board. 
The rights of shareholders 
This principle deals with the rights of shareholders. It concerns the protection of shareholders rights and the 
ability of shareholders to influence the behaviour of the corporation. The basic shareholders’ rights include the 
right to: secure methods of ownership registration; convey or transfer shares; obtain relevant information on the 
corporation on the timely and regular basis; participate and vote in general shareholder meetings; elect members 
of the board; and share in profits of the corporation. Fredrick (1999) notes that while these rights are important to 
good governance, it must be noted that extensive rights in and of themselves are not equivalent to good 
governance.  
Equitable treatment of shareholders 
This principle emphasizes that all shareholders, including foreign shareholders, should be treated fairly by 
controlling shareholders, board and management. This principle calls for transparency with respect to the 
distribution of voting rights and the ways in which voting rights are exercised. The high points of the principles 
include: all shareholders of the same class should be treated equally. Insider trading and abusive self-dealing 
should be prohibited. Members of the board and management should be required to disclose any material 
interests in transactions or matters affecting the corporation. 
The role of stakeholders 
A good corporate governance framework should recognise the rights stakeholders have, as established by law, 
such a framework should encourage active cooperation between corporations and stakeholders in creating 
wealth, jobs and the sustainability of a sound enterprise. To achieve this, corporate governance should ensure 
that; the rights of stakeholders are protected by law, the rights of the shareholders are respected; stakeholders 
have the opportunity to redress any violation of their rights, permit performance enhancing mechanism for 
stakeholder’s participation, provides stakeholders with access to all relevant information to enable them 
participate actively in the governance process. 
 
CONCEPTS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 
According to the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN), there are several concepts of corporate 
governance. In companies, these concepts should be evident in the relationship between the shareholders and the 
board of directors. Some of these concepts should also apply to the company’s dealings with its employees, 
customers, suppliers and the general public. These concepts are described briefly to see the importance of the 
applicability of these concepts. In particular, how the absence of these concepts might affect the relationship 
between the board of directors and the shareholders. 
Fairness 
In corporate governance, fairness refers to the principle that all shareholders should receive fair treatment from 
the directors. At a basic level, it means that all the equity shareholders in a company should be entitled to equal 
treatment, such as one vote per share at general meetings of the company and the right to same dividend per 
share. In UK for example, the concept of fair treatment for shareholders is supported by the law (which provides 
some protection for minority shareholders against unjust treatment by the directors or majority shareholders). 
However, in some countries, the law provides little or no protection for minority shareholders. For example, in a 
takeover bid for a company, the law might permit a higher price to be offered to large shareholders than the price 
offered to small shareholders. 
Openness/Transparency 
Openness or transparency means „not hiding anything‟. Intentions should be clear, and information should not 
be withheld from individuals who ought to have a right to receive it. Transparency means clarity. In corporate 
governance, it should refer not only to the ability of the shareholders to see what the directors are trying to 
achieve. It also refers to the ease with which an „outsiders‟, such as a potential investor or an employee can 
make a meaningful analysis of the company and its intentions. Transparency therefore means providing 
information about what the company has done, what it intends to do in the future and what risks it faces. In 
public sector organisations and government, openness means telling the public and not making decisions „behind 
closed doors‟. 
In listed companies (such as banks) openness includes matters such as: 
 Requiring major shareholders to declare the size of their shareholding in the company. 
 Requiring the board of directors to announce to the stock market information about any major new 
developments in the company’s affairs, so that all shareholders and other investors are kept informed. 
Responsibility and Accountability 
The directors of a company are given most of the powers for running the company. Many of these powers are 
delegated to executive managers, but the directors remain responsible for the way in which those powers are 
used. An important role of the board of directors is to monitor the decisions of executive management and to 
satisfy themselves that the decisions taken by management are in the best interests of the company and its 
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shareholders. The board of directors should also retain the responsibility for certain key decisions, such as setting 
strategic objectives for their company and approving major capital investments. A board of directors should not 
ignore their responsibilities by delegating too many powers to executive management, and letting the 
management team „get the job‟; the board should accept its responsibilities. 
With responsibility, there should also be accountability. In a company, the board of directors should be 
accountable to the shareholders. Shareholders should also be able to consider reports from the directors about 
what they have done, and how the company has performed under their stewardship, and give their approval or 
show disapproval. Some of the ways in which the board are accountable are as follows: 
(i) Presenting the annual reports and accounts to the shareholders, for the shareholders to consider and discuss 
with the board. This happens at the annual general meeting of the company. 
(ii) If shareholders do not approve of a director, they are able to remove him from office. Individual directors 
may be required to submit themselves for re-election by shareholders at regular intervals. In the UK for example, 
it is common practice for directors to retire every three years and stand for re-election at the Company’s annual 
general meeting. 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
One consequence of the separation of ownership from management is that the day to day decision-making power 
(that is, the power to make decision over the use of the capital supplied by the shareholders) rests with persons 
other than the shareholders themselves. The separation of ownership and control has given rise to an agency 
problem whereby there is the tendency for management to operate the firm in their own interests, rather than 
those of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). This creates opportunities for 
managers to build illegitimate empires and, in the extreme, outright expropriation. Various suggestions have 
been made in the literature as to how the problem can be reduced (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997 and Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Some of the mechanisms (based on Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997), and their impediments to monitor and shape banks‟ behaviour are discussed below: 
Shareholders 
Shareholders play a key role in the provision of corporate governance. Small or diffuse shareholders exert 
corporate governance by directly voting on critical issues, such as mergers, liquidation, and fundamental changes 
in business strategy and indirectly sby electing the boards of directors to represent their interests and oversee the 
myriad of managerial decisions. Incentive contracts are a common mechanism for aligning the interests of 
managers with those of shareholders. The Board of directors may negotiate managerial compensation with a 
view to achieving particular results. Thus small shareholders may exert corporate governance directly through 
their voting rights and indirectly through the board of directors elected by them. However, a variety of factors 
could prevent small shareholders from effectively exerting corporate control. There are large information 
asymmetries between managers and small shareholders as managers have enormous discretion over the flow of 
information. Also, small shareholders often lack the expertise to monitor managers accompanied by each 
investor’s small stake, which could induce a free-rider problem. 
Large (concentrated) ownership is another corporate governance mechanism for preventing managers from 
deviating too far from the interests of the owners. Large investors have to acquire information and monitor 
managers. They can also elect their representatives to the board of directors and thwart managerial control of the 
board. Large and well-informed shareholders could be more effective at exercising their voting rights than an 
ownership structure dominated by small, comparatively uninformed investors. Also, they could effectively 
negotiate managerial incentive contracts that align owner and manager interests than poorly informed small 
shareholders whose representatives, the board of directors, can be manipulated by the management. However, 
concentrated ownership raises some corporate governance problems. 
Large investors could exploit business relationships with other firms they own which could profit them at 
the expense of the bank. In general, large shareholders could maximize the private benefits of control at the 
expense of small investors. 
Debt Holders 
Debt purchasers provide finance in return for a promised stream of payments and a variety of other covenants 
relating to corporate behaviour, such as the value and risk of corporate assets. If the corporation violates these 
covenants or default on the payments, debt holders typically could obtain the rights to repossess collateral, throw 
the corporation into bankruptcy proceedings, vote in the decision to reorganize, and remove managers. However, 
there could be barriers to diffuse debt holders to effectively exert corporate governance as envisaged. Small debt 
holders may be unable to monitor complex organization and could face the free-rider incentives, as small equity 
holders. Also, the effective exertion of corporate control with diffuse debts depends largely on the efficiency of 
the legal and bankruptcy systems. Large debt holders, like large equity holders, could ameliorate some of the 
information and contract enforcement problems associated with diffuse debt. Due to their large investment, they 
are more likely to have the ability and the incentives to exert control over the firm by monitoring managers. 
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Large creditors obtain various control rights in the case of default or violation of covenants. In terms of cash 
flow, they can renegotiate the terms of the loans, which may avoid inefficient bankruptcies. The effectiveness of 
large creditors however, relies importantly on effective and efficient legal and bankruptcy systems. If the legal 
system does not efficiently identify the violation of contracts and provide the means to bankrupt and reorganize 
firms, then creditors could lose a crucial mechanism for exerting corporate governance. Also, large creditors, like 
large shareholders, may attempt to shift the activities of the bank to reflect their own preferences. Large creditors 
for example, as noted by Myers (1997) may induce the company to forego good investments and take on too 
little risk because the creditor bears some of the cost but will not share the benefits. 
According to Oman (2001), corporate governance mechanisms including accounting and auditing standards 
are designed to monitor managers and improve corporate transparency. Furthermore, a number of corporate 
governance mechanisms have been identified analytically and empirically. These, according to Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996), may be broadly classified as internal and external mechanisms as summarized below: 
External corporate governance mechanisms 
 
Source: Adapted from Agrawal and Kneober (1996) 
Internal Corporate governance mechanisms 
Source: Adapted from Agrawal and Kneober (1996) 
Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) suggest that governance mechanisms “protect shareholders‟ 
interest, minimise agency costs and ensure agent-principal interest alignment”. They further opined that agency 
theory assumptions are based on delegation and control, where controls “minimise the potential abuse of the 
delegation”. This control function is primarily exercised by the board of directors.  
Agency Theories 
Much of the research into corporate governance derives from agency theory. Since the early work of Berle and 
Means in 1932, corporate governance has focused upon the separation of ownership and pedals which results in 
principal-agent problems arising from the dispersed ownership in the modern corporation. They regarded 
corporate governance as a mechanism where a board of directors is a crucial monitoring device to minimize the 
problems brought about by the principal-agent relationship. In this context, agents are the managers, principals 
are the owners and the boards of directors’ act as the monitoring mechanism (Mallin, 2004). Moreover, literature 
on corporate governance attributes two factors to agency theory. The first factor is that corporations are reduced 
to two participants, managers and shareholders whose interests are assumed to be both clear and consistent. A 
second notion is that humans are self-interested and disinclined to sacrifice their personal interests for the 
interests of the others (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003). The seminal papers of Alchian and Demstez (1972) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), describe the firm as a nexus of contracts among individual factors of production 
resulting in the emergence of the agency theory. The firm is not an individual but a legal fiction, where 
conflicting objectives of individuals are brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual 
relationships. These contractual relationships are not only with employees, but with suppliers, customers and 
creditors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The intention of these contracts is that all the parties acting in their self-
interest are motivated to maximize the value of the organization, reducing the agency costs and adopting 
accounting methods that most efficiently reflect their own performance (Deegan, 2004). 
However, the agency problem depends on the ownership characteristics of each country. In Countries where 
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ownership structures are dispersed, if the investors disagree with the management or are disappointed with the 
performance of the company, they use the exit options, which will be signalled through reduction in share prices. 
Whereas countries with concentrated ownership structures and large dominant shareholders, tend to control 
the managers and expropriate minority shareholders in order to gain private control benefits (Spanos, 2005). 
Therefore, according to the view of the agency theorists, an efficient market is considered a solution to 
mitigate the agency problem, which includes an efficient market for corporate control, management labour and 
corporate information (Clarke, 2004). According to Johanson and Ostergen (2010) even though agency theory 
provides a valuable insight into corporate governance, its‟ applies to countries in the Anglo-Saxon model of 
governance as in Malaysia. Various governance mechanisms have been discussed by agency theorists in relation 
to protecting the shareholder interests, minimizing agency costs and ensure alignment of the agent-principal 
relationship. Among the mechanisms that have received substantial attention, and are within the scope of this 
study, are the governance structures (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). 
Stakeholder Theory 
This theory centres on the issues concerning the stakeholders in an institution. It stipulates that a corporate entity 
invariably seeks to provide a balance between the interests of its diverse stakeholders in order to ensure that each 
interest constituency receives some degree of satisfaction (Abrams, 1951). However, there is an argument that 
the theory is narrow (Coleman, 2008) because it identifies the shareholders as the only interest group of a 
corporate entity. However, the stakeholder theory is better in explaining the role of corporate governance than 
the agency theory by highlighting different constituents of a firm (Coleman, 2008). With an original view of the 
firm the shareholder is the only one recognized by business law in most countries because they are the owners of 
the companies. In view of this, the firm has a fiduciary duty to maximize their returns and put their needs first. In 
more recent business models, the institution converts the inputs of investors, employees, and suppliers into forms 
that are saleable to customers, hence returns back to its shareholders. 
This model addresses the needs of investors, employers, suppliers and customers. Pertaining to the scenario 
above, stakeholder theory argues that the parties involved should include governmental bodies, political groups, 
trade associations, trade unions, communities, associated corporations, prospective employees and the general 
public. In some scenarios competitors and prospective clients can be regarded as stakeholders to help improve 
business efficiency in the market place. Stakeholder theory has become more prominent because many 
researchers have recognized that the activities of a corporate entity impact on the external environment requiring 
accountability of the organization to a wider audience than simply its shareholders. 
Research Design 
The research adopts the basic research and ex-post facto research design (Adetayo, 2011) using panel data. This 
is because the study combines time series and cross-sectional data for the sampled banks over a period of five (5) 
years (2014 – 2018). The data collected at these different time period were analysed to discover trends over the 
period. To achieve the objectives set out at the commencement of this work, there is a need to gather data on two 
variables (Independent and Dependent). Data on  Corporate Governance elements (Independent) and data on 
profitability (performance) of the sampled banks for the period covered (2014 – 2018). 
Source of Data 
The data to be used in this research will be secondary and will be generated from the published annual financial 
statements of the ten (10) banks under study covering a period of five (5) years (2014 _ 2018). 
Population, Sample Size and Sample Technique 
The population of this research consists of the twenty-one (21) listed commercial banks, as released by the 
Central Bank of Nigeria in December, 2018. These banks were so used because they were considered viable and 
were seen to have the required financial requirements to carry on banking business in Nigeria 
From these banks, ten (10) banks will be purposively taken out of the population under consideration based 
on certain parameters stated in this study. These banks are Zenith bank, Guaranty Trust Bank, First Bank, Access 
bank, United Bank for Africa, Fidelity Bank, Ecobank, Wema Bank, First City Monument Bank and Diamond 
Bank. The sampling technique used is the judgemental non-probabilistic sampling technique based on certain 
parameters. The parameters used in selecting the banks were the indicators of the strength of a bank: its 
international reckoning, profitability, shareholders‘s fund, total assets, earnings and customer deposits. This is 
because only listed banks can be termed public limited liability banks (Plc.) which are also expected to comply 
fully with the requirements of CBN code of corporate governance. Also, being listed enabled the researcher to 
have access to the banks’ annual reports used in the course of this research. 
Measurement of Variables 
The independent variables of the study are corporate governance, board size, non-executive directors and female 
directors. These will be measured as follows: 
Corporate Governance: A corporate governance disclosure index (CGDI) will then be computed by using the 
following formula: 
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CGDI=Total Score of the Individual Company  x 100 
Maximum Possible Score Obtainable by Company 
Where the total score of the individual company = the number of issues or condition or requirement under the 
post-consolidation code of best practices met by each banks, while the maximum possible score obtainable by 
each company = the total number of issues under the post-consolidation code of best practices (that is 25). 
Board Size: This measures the total number of directors, both executives and Non-executives. 
Non-Executive Directors: This measures the number of non-executive directors sitting on the board. 
Female Directors: This measures the number of female directors. 
The dependent variable is banks profitability and this will be measured by market price per share (MPS), where 
market per share (MPS) is the price at which one unit of a company’s stock is sold 
Data Analysis Methods 
The data for this research will be analysed with respect to each objective of the study. The data analysis 
techniques to be used are as follows: 
Objective 1: With the help of the list of disclosure issues (see appendix), the annual reports of the banks will be 
examined and a dichotomous procedure of content analysis will follow to score each of the disclosure issue. 
Each bank will be awarded a score of “1” if it appears to have disclosed the concerned issue and “0” if  
otherwise. The score of each bank was totalled to find out the net score of the bank. A corporate governance 
disclosure index (CGDI) was then computed to ascertain the trend of corporate governance disclosure. 
Objective 2: Objective two will be analysed using simple regression analysis 
Objective 3: The relationship between the variables will be ascertained using multiple regression analysis. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Trend Analysis Graph of Corporate Governance Disclosure Index for Zenith Bank for the Period of 
2014 – 2018. 
 
Source: Financial Statement, (NSE). 2019 
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Trend Analysis Graph of Corporate Governance Disclosure Index for Guaranty Trust Bank for the 
Period of 2010 – 2016. 
 
Source: Financial Statement, (NSE). 
 
Trend Analysis of Corporate Governance Disclosure of First Bank for the Period of 2014-2018. 
 
Source: Financial Statement, (NSE). 2019 
 
Trend Analysis of Corporate Governance Disclosure of Access Bank for the Period of 2010-2016. 
 
Source: Financial Statement, (NSE). 2019 
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Trend Analysis of Corporate Governance Disclosure of United Bank for Africa for the Period of 2010-
2016. 
 
Source: Financial Statement, (NSE). 2019 
 
Trend Analysis of Corporate Governance Disclosure of Fidelity Bank for the Period of 2014-2018. 
 
Source: Financial Statement, (NSE). 2019 
 
Trend Analysis of Corporate Governance Disclosure of Ecobank for the Period of 2014-2018. 
 
Source: Financial Statement, (NSE). 2019 
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Trend Analysis of Corporate Governance Disclosure of Wema Bank for the Period of 2014-2018 
 
Source: Financial Statement, (NSE). 2019 
 
Trend Analysis of Corporate Governance Disclosure of First City Monument Bank (FCMB) for 
the Period of 2010-2016. 
 
Source: Financial Statement, (NSE). 2019 
Trend Analysis of Corporate Governance Disclosure of Diamond Bank for the Period of 2014-
2018. 
 
Source: Financial Statement, (NSE). 2019 
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Relationship between the level of Corporate Governance Disclosure and the performance of Commercial 
banks in Nigeria. 
Objective two of this study examined the relationship between the level of Corporate Governance Disclosure and 
the performance of Commercial banks. The researcher used a correlation analysis to examine this relationship. 
The table showed that there was a weak negative relationship of 2.79% between corporate governance disclosure 
index (CGDI) and market price per share (MPS) of Nigerian banks. This negative relationship indicated that the 
two variables move in opposite direction and moreover, it implied that both variables could explain each other 
negatively by 0.0279. 
Relationship between Corporate Governance Disclosure Index and Market Price per Share of Nigeria 
Banks. 
VARIABLE  MPS  CGDI  
MPS  1.0000  
(0.0000)  
 




Source: Financial Statement, (NSE). 2019 
Effect of Corporate Governance characteristics on the Performance of Commercial Banks in Nigeria. 
The stock performance being the response variable was captured by Market price per share (MPS) while the 
explanatory variables included Board Size (BS), Non-Executive director (NED) and Number of Female director 
(NUM) are the regressors used in achieving this objective. Ordinary least square methods of three models 
namely fixed effect; random effect and ordinary effect were estimated. Post estimation diagnostic test of 
Hausman test and redundant fixed effect test were adopted in selecting the most appropriate model to capture the 
impact of corporate governance characteristics on stock performance of banks. The test indicated that random 
effect is not an appropriate model and non-normality of the variables will not encourage the use of ordinary 
effect, therefore, in estimating the parsimonious model of the variable, fixed effect will be an appropriate 
assumption. 86.78% of the stock performance of banks was accounted for by the explanatory variables, while 
after adjusting the co-efficient of determination due to degree of freedom, the percentage of banks ‘stock 
performance fell to 80.77%, this implies that about 80.77% of the banks stock performance was accounted for by 
the explanatory variables. The F-statistics of 14.4464, with the p-value < 0.05 so that the explanatory variables 
are jointly different from zero and Durbin-Watson statistics of 1.986465 reported the likelihood of no 
autocorrelation. Based on the result, only one of the three explanatory variables number of executive director 
(NED) (β = -0.290836, t= -0.570188 and p-value = 0.0425) was significant at 95% level of confidence. 
From this result, the number of executive director (NED) was negatively and significantly related to banks‘ stock 
performance at 5% level, the following statistics were estimated of NED using Fixed Effect Method, (β = -
0.290836, t= -0.570188 and p-value = 0.0425) This signified that banks‘ stock performance will decrease by 
29.08% given a 100% increase in NED of banks. Based on this result, it is advisable for Nigerian banks to pay 
attention to the structure of its non-executive directors as it has a significant negative effect on the market price 
per share of banks. This negative contribution between NED and banks‟ stock performance negate our aprior 
expectation. 
Correlation Matrix 
VARIABLE  MPS  BS  NED  NUM  
MPS  1.0000  
(0.0000)  
   
     




















Source: Financial Statement, (NSE). 2019 
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Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings of this study, it showed that only the number of non-executive directors had a negative 
effect on the market price per share of the banks under study. The findings of this study revealed that importance 
should be placed on the board characteristics of banks especially the on the number of non-executive directors 
which was significant to the market price per share. It showed that banks ‘stock performance will decrease by 
29.08% given a 100% increase in number of non-executive directors (NED) of banks. 
The study concluded that there is uniformity in the disclosure of corporate governance practices made by 
banks in Nigeria. Findings also showed that most banks just stated that the right of shareholders are protected 
especially the right to vote at the annual general meeting but did not state in details the other rights of 
shareholders Furthermore, the study concludes that a negative relationship exists between the level of corporate 
governance disclosure and the stock performance of deposit money banks in Nigeria. Based on the findings of 
this research, the following recommendations are made which will be useful to internal and external 
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Firstly, efforts should be made to improve corporate governance focus on the stock performance of deposit 
money banks since the stock performance is a measure of the wealth of shareholders. 
Secondly, the Central bank of Nigeria and other relevant authorities should also try to ensure that steps are 
taken for mandatory and absolute compliance with the code of corporate governance. Also, an effective legal 
framework should be developed that specifies the rights and obligations of a bank, its directors, shareholders, 
specific disclosure requirements and provide for effective enforcement of the law. Authority may place higher 
emphasis on certain aspect of governance if they are considered to be a basic component or prerequisite to 
implementing others and thus should be given more weight. 
Finally, there is the need to set up a unified corporate body saddled with the responsibility of collecting and 
collating corporate governance related data and constructing the relevant indices to facilitate corporate 
governance research in Nigeria as the study stated that corporate governance disclosure has a positive 
relationship with the market price per share of deposit money banks in Nigeria. 
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